INTRODUCTION
Every four years the United States of America elects a new President. That person will serve as the President for all 308 million Americans. He or she will occupy 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue making decisions ranging from the mundane to matters of life and death. Ostensibly, a presidential candidate seeks the support and considers the views of every U.S. citizen-from the largest cities to the smallest towns, from the wealthiest suburbs to the poorest inner cities, from the east coast to the west coast, and every place in between. Unfortunately, the reality is very different.
In our current system for electing the President, if you live in vast stretches of the country, the presidential candidates will never campaign in your state, he or she will not allocate campaign resources to your state, and he or she will not run television ads, radio ads, or any other forms of campaigning in your state. In fact, if you are not interested in politics, it would be possible to be oblivious to an ongoing presidential campaign.
However, if you live in Ohio, Florida, Colorado, Virginia, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, Iowa, or Nevada, the candidates for president are ubiquitous. They are in your state seemingly weekly, constantly asking for your vote in television ads, direct mail advertising, internet advertising, and even in face-to-face contact at campaign events. This is the state of American presidential campaigns today: a bifurcated system in which your vote matters to the candidates in direct proportion to the competitiveness of your state. The cause of this situation is the winner-take-all Electoral College allocation system, which all but two states have adopted to award their Electoral College votes.
Most critics of the current winner-take-all allocation system believe that the way to correct the problems caused by the current system is to scrap the Electoral College completely, and replace it with a National Popular Vote (NPV) for the President. The advocates of this method reject the Framers' federalist-republican views reflected in the design of the Constitution in favor of simple, populist majority rule. However, this break with our constitutional traditions would create more problems than it would solve.
There is a better solution to problems created by use of the winner-take-all system under the Electoral College: the Federal District Popular Vote (FDPV) allocation method. Currently employed by Nebraska and Maine, this system allocates each state's Electoral College votes in two ways. First, the presidential candidate who wins the state's popular vote is awarded two electoral votes for winning the popular vote. Second, the rest of the state's electoral votes are awarded to the winner of each congressional district's popular vote. The two electoral votes awarded to the winner of the state's popular vote represent the two votes allocated to each state under our federalist system, while the rest represent the population of each state.
Under the constitutional framework, the current allocation system may be changed to the FDPV allocation method through individual state legislative enactments, a federal constitutional amendment, or a compact of states. In addition, the constitutionality of this allocation model cannot be questioned. Under Article II of the United States Constitution, state legislatures may determine the manner in which electoral votes are awarded. 1 Part I of this Comment outlines the history of the Electoral College. Part II describes how the current winner-take-all system used by forty-eight states is harmful to American Democracy. Part III discusses the other principal reform proposal, the NPV, and explains why it is not the best way to ameliorate the problems caused by the current system. Finally, Part IV sets forth the proposal that the states, through legislative enactments, should change the current winner-take-all Electoral College allocation plan to the FDPV allocation system, because it will preserve the Constitution, produce more electorally competitive areas, and increase voter participation.
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I. BACKGROUND
A. Origin of the Electoral College System
The Constitution of the United States of America was created by a series of compromises, including the compromise that led to the creation of the Electoral College. The Electoral College system settled a fierce debate among three sets of opposing factions: (1) between delegates who supported the direct election of the president and those that supported the congressional election of the president, (2) those that supported the interests of large and small states, and (3) delegates from free and slave states. 2 The Framers debated two main proposals: (1) a popular vote, in which the president would be elected based on the total popular votes throughout the country, and (2) a congressional vote, in which Congress would be allowed to elect the president. 3 Dismayed by the proposal of a congressionally elected president, James Madison argued that this method would make the president "beholden to the Congress that selected him." 4 The delegates reached a compromise that is still used as the method by which we elect a president. 5 The method, outlined by the Framers, reduced the chances of "cabal, intrigue and corruption," 6 since the electors were limited to citizens of the individual state, "but no Senator 935, 944 (1996) . 5 Note, supra note 2, at 2528.
To effectuate this compromise, the Framers divided the presidential election process into two stages: a "nomination" stage, in which an electoral college of elders would express a filtered version of the popular will, and a "selection" stage, in which the House of Representatives would ultimately choose the winner from among the top several candidates. In the event that any candidate received a majority of electoral votes, a situation that the Framers envisioned occurring rarely, that candidate would be elected President.
Id.
6 THE FEDERALIST NO. 68 (Alexander Hamilton). 7 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
This compromise, which was incorporated into the Constitution, ensures that the president and vice president are not elected by the direct votes of the citizens of each state, but by presidential electors chosen by means determined by the respective state legislatures. 8 According to Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution: "Each State shall appoint, in such a Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the state may be entitled in the Congress." 9 The Committee of Eleven's Electoral College proposal favored smaller states, 10 but also preserved larger population states' importance in whom was elected president. 11 The current winner-take-all allocation method and the congressional district allocation method, the method on which the FDPV is modeled, were quite common in early presidential elections. 12 However, by 1832 only two states awarded their electoral votes by a method different from the winner-take-all method to which we are accustomed. 13 The move toward the winner-take-all method was driven by the undemocratic will of the majority party in each state to consolidate power, thus denying the minority party any of the state's electoral votes in presidential elections. 14 Despite court challenges, both the winner-take-all and congressional district methods have been upheld as constitutional. In the recent case, New v. Ashcroft, 15 17 The Court held that the allocation of a state's Electoral College votes by congressional district does not violate the Constitution, which declares "each state shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of senators and representatives to which the state may be entitled in the congress." 18 The Court added that while the Constitution gave the state legislatures plenary power to prescribe the method of choosing electors, it did not obligate a state to act as a unit in allocating its Electoral College votes. 19 
B. Current Problems
To advocates of preserving the original meaning and intent of the Constitution and the foundation for Federalism, the Electoral College is a highly-regarded institution that gives a more equal voice to all states, regardless of their population.
To advocates of the NPV, the Electoral College is an archaic institution that should be abolished. They question the wisdom of the Electoral College and point to 1824, 1876, 1888, and 2000; years in which the Electoral College led to the election of the second place popular vote winner. 20 However, it is the contention of this author that in all four of those elections, the Electoral College performed as intended: it balanced the will of the voters in the larger population states with the will of the voters in the smaller population states. In all three elections in which the 257 22 This illustrates the importance of the individual state under the Electoral College system: even a state with the minimum three electoral votes has the potential power to sway a presidential election, while in an NPV system their significance would be virtually non-existent.
It is also clear that the nature and structure of American politics has changed. In his farewell address, President George Washington warned the country to avoid sectionalism. 23 At least with regard to our politics, we have failed to avoid this pitfall. The Civil War, for example, was principally caused by sectionalism when Republican Abraham Lincoln claimed the White House without a single electoral vote in the South. 24 While the Civil War preserved the union, political sectionalism remains an ever-present attribute of American politics. For example, the solid-South delivered its Electoral College votes to the Democratic nominee like clockwork from the 1880s to the 1950s. 25 came across American presidential politics as the solid-South broke, the Republican North became the Democratic North and the change in the country's demographics inaugurated an era of realignment in American politics. 26 As this realignment process took hold, presidential landslides occurred in 1964, 1972, 1980, 1984, and 1988. 27 During this period, states were not as wedded to one political party as they are now. States voting one way in one election and the other in the next were much more common.
Georgia is a perfect example of this phenomenon. In 1960, Democrat John F. Kennedy received a higher percentage of Georgia's popular vote than he received in his native Massachusetts. 28 In 1964, Georgia delivered its electoral votes to a Republican, Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater, who won the state despite losing the national election in a landslide. 29 The next presidential election saw Georgia award its electoral votes to Alabama Governor George Wallace, who won the state as an Independent. 30 In 1972, Republican Richard Nixon won every single county in the state, and, in 1976, Democrat Jimmy Carter won every single county in the state. 31 As this example demonstrates, in five presidential elections from 1960 to 1976, Georgia voted twice for a Democrat, twice for a Republican, and once for an independent candidate. In comparison, in the five most recent presidential elections, Georgia voted solidly for the Republican nominee all five times. 32 As Georgia illustrates, the country's realignment has settled into a red state versus blue state map in the last five presidential 26 Id. 27 Carolina, which has a Cook PVI of four. 37 As states become more polarized, they become less likely to be seen as determinative in a presidential election, which leads to the problem this Comment has identified with the current winner-take-all system. The current winner-take-all Electoral College system coupled with the red versus blue state divide has led to a bifurcated country, where the presidential candidates spend copious amounts of time and money in the swing states and very little to none in the remaining states. 38 In fact, on October 18, 2012, at the Al Smith Dinner in New York City, President Obama cracked a joke that demonstrated, in a light-hearted way, the great importance of the select few states and the total lack of importance in the candidates' minds about the vast majority of America: "In less than three weeks, voters in states like Ohio, Virginia and Florida will decide this incredibly important election. Which begs the question, what are we doing here?" 39 The focus on the swing states has become so overwhelming that Senator Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.) said, of Presidential Candidate Mitt Romney, "I think what Romney needs to do is get into Virginia and run for sheriff." 40 A recent USA Today article about the swing states in this election cycle led off with this line: "When it comes to campaign ads in the presidential race, there are two Americas." 41 These statements encapsulate the primary deficiency in the winner-take-all system: the presidential election, which determines the leader of the entire country, comes down to only a few states. The fact that this occurs to such an extreme that the presidential campaigns focus so intensely on so few states that the campaigns become a series of quasi-sheriffs campaigns should 43 There are "two Americas" because of the campaign methods employed to attract swing voters.
The two main ways that campaigns seek to reach voters are campaign ads and campaign visits. This Comment proceeds to discuss each and shows how the winner-take-all allocation method has led to a great disparity in ad spending and campaign visits between swing states and non-swing states.
A. Campaign Ad Spending
The main method campaigns employ to reach voters is through campaign ads on local and cable television. It is also the first place to look to see the great inequity that has developed in our country between swing and non-swing states.
From May 1, 2012 until Election Day 2012, the presidential campaigns and their surrogates, unaffiliated groups, and other entities spent: $173 million in Florida, $151 million in Virginia, $150 million in Ohio, $97 million in North Carolina, $73 million in Colorado, $57 million in Iowa, $55 million in Nevada, $39 million in New Hampshire, and $33 million in Wisconsin on campaign ads. 44 In comparison, the Obama and Romney campaigns and allied groups spent nothing at all in Mississippi and only $6,020 in Georgia. 45 In fact, California, the nation's most populous state, 46 42 Id. 43 
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with roughly one-eighth the country's population, accounted for $320 in campaign ad spending and the country's largest city, New York City, received exactly one ad. 47 Some states did not receive even a dime in campaign spending. 48 Their president was decided by the time and money the candidates dumped into the nine battleground states. 49 All the money the candidates, party committees, and unaffiliated thirdparty groups spend in the battleground states translates to exposure to the American people. The campaigns clearly believe some of the American people's votes are more important than others. This is made clear when you look at the sheer volume of campaign ads in Florida during the 2012 presidential campaign. The parties ran 202,913 campaign ads in the state of Florida from May 1, 2012 until Election Day, which amounts to roughly 1,068 campaign ads every day. 50 The voters in the Miami metro area, with a population roughly equal to the population of the Atlanta metro area, 51 received 6,169 times the attention from the campaigns; 24,676 campaign ads were run in the Miami area, 52 whereas only four campaign ads were run in the Atlanta metro. 53 The 2012 presidential campaigns spent enormous amounts of money on campaign televisions ads in swing states. The average television viewer saw eighty-seven campaign spots a week in Cleveland, Ohio and seventy campaign spots per week in Orlando, Florida, "while the rest of the country is virtually ad-free." 54 addition, at the halfway point of the 2012 campaign, voters in only sixty-seven of the country's 210 media markets had the opportunity to see television campaign ads. 55 According to Elizabeth Wilner of Kantar/Campaign Media Analysis Group, an organization which tracks campaign advertising, "People are seeing more spots in fewer states than they were four or eight years ago-more advertisers, and a lot more money is being squeezed into a smaller number of markets." 56 In August of 2012, President Obama's campaign planned to spend $125 million that month and the rest of the campaign. 57 Of that amount, $7.5 million was slated to be on cable, which would reach a national audience, but that figure paled in comparison to what was spent in Florida alone. 58 Virtually, every cent remaining was slated to be spent in the nine battleground states. 59
B. Campaign Visits: Swing States Matter
Campaign ads are only half the story; the second principal way presidential campaigns and candidates seek to win over voters in swing states is through campaign visits. These visits have a tendency to blanket swing states and leave non-swing states largely, if not totally, ignored.
From the time Governor Romney unofficially clinched the 2012 Republican presidential nomination in late April through late September, roughly forty states failed to host a single campaign event. 60 President Obama, Governor Romney, Vice President Joe Biden, Congressman Paul Ryan, and their spouses had campaigned in as few as ten states and had visited only a handful of non-competitive states to host fundraisers. 61 63 The number of visits to swing states compared to non-swing state neighbors is overwhelming. The nine battleground states 64 had 644 campaign visits after June 2012, 65 with roughly half of those visits to just three states: Virginia, Ohio, and Florida. 66 In comparison, large states like Georgia had not rated a single visit. 67 During the last thirty days of the Washington Post study, the difference is even starker. The nine battleground states 68 had been visited 152 times, or roughly five times a day, while roughly half the states did not even rate a fundraiser during those thirty days. 69 This problem is not unique to the 2012 presidential campaign. Similar trends existed in earlier presidential campaigns and have only become more pronounced. During the last six weeks leading up to the 2004 election, President George W. Bush and Senator John Kerry held 92% of their campaign events in only eleven states. 70 Those eleven states accounted for only 27% of the national population, 71 meaning 73% of the population received only 8% of the candidates' time. 72 But the numbers become even more troubling when you dive into them further. Accounting for 51% of the nation's population, the twentyfive least visited states hosted only three campaign events and all three of those events were held in either California or Texas. 73 Thus, twenty-three states did not receive a single campaign visit. 74 The concentration of campaign visits in the swing states became even more pronounced in the final six weeks leading up to the 2008 presidential election. Then-Senator Obama and Senator McCain held 99% of all campaign events in just fourteen states, which accounted for just 31% of the national population. 75 In fact, the four most contested states 76 received more than half of all campaign stops for the entire country. 77 In addition, neither campaign visited thirty-two states at all. 78 This Comment contends that if American presidential campaigns continue to be decided in a handful of states, where the campaigns spend hundreds of millions of dollars focused on fewer than ten states, and virtually nothing in the rest of the country, American democracy will be damaged by candidates focusing disproportionate attention on competitive states, thus engendering voter apathy in the vast majority of the country.
III. NATIONAL POPULAR VOTE: THE PATH TO MORE PROBLEMS
Most critics of the current winner-take-all Electoral College allocation system advocate a change to the National Popular Vote (NPV). By a nearly two-to-one margin, the American people support amending the Constitution to eliminate the Electoral College and replace it with the NPV method. 79 In fact, nearly ten percent of all proposed constitutional amendments have targeted the Electoral College, seeking to change the system. 80 The demand for change intensified after the contested 2000 election, in which the winner of the Electoral College lost the popular vote. 81 Most supporters of a change favor the NPV, which would determine the winner of the presidency simply by which candidate garnered the most votes nationwide. However, the NPV has many weaknesses that render it an undesirable alternative to the current system. First, it may lead to campaigns geared toward densely populated, geographically compact areas, which would serve to disenfranchise voters in more sparsely populated areas. Second, it may lead to base centered campaigns that would compel candidates to focus their limited campaign resources on maximizing turnout amongst their most likely voters at the expense of independents, moderates, and firsttime voters. Third, an NPV would completely change the constitutional structure the Framers envisioned as the best way to elect a President; this would adversely affect the interests of less populous states.
A. The NPV Would Lead Candidates to Focus on Major Metropolitan Areas
An NPV system would require candidates to concentrate campaign efforts and resources in heavily populated areas where the majority of Americans live in order to maximize the turnout of their voters. 93 A further study of population patterns in the country shows that great swaths of the country are very sparsely populated, while some areas are very heavily populated. 94 With such concentrated numbers of voters in major metropolitan areas such as Los Angeles, Phoenix, New York, Houston, Dallas, Miami, Atlanta, and Chicago, the swing state focused campaigns would most likely become metropolitan-centered campaigns in which candidates would focus only on densely populated areas where great numbers of voters reside.
The NPV system does not correct the principal problem of the bifurcated nature of American presidential politics; it merely switches emphasis from swing states to major metropolitan areas. Therefore, a campaign focused on large metropolitan areas would lead candidates to focus only on issues that are important to metropolitan voters. Issues pertaining to farming, manufacturing, mining, ranching, forestry, oil and gas, and other rural activities may be omitted from candidates' platforms or simply be given a passing mention, while issues paramount in the minds of voters in densely populated areas such as crime, transportation, and the 91 DAVE LEIP'S ATLAS OF U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS, supra note 21. 92 cost of living would receive disproportionately greater attention from presidential campaigns.
The NPV would be a step in the wrong direction compared to the status quo. The current winner-take-all allocation method, which leads to swing state centered campaigning, requires presidential candidates to focus on a broad cross-section of issues, since many of the swing states are very economically, culturally, and demographically diverse. For example, Ohio has three major metropolitan areas 95 -Cleveland, Columbus, and Cincinnatiwhich require candidates to seek their votes by tailoring their campaign messages to issues important to those voters. However, Ohio also has vast rural areas that have different economic activities such as the coal industry in eastern and southeastern Ohio, farming in the rural western part of the state, and manufacturing in the northwestern area of the state. 96 It is clear that the status quo is better than the proposed NPV in addressing a diverse country's issues and needs.
B. The NPV Would Lead to Base Centered Campaigning
A second negative effect of the NPV is it may radically shift campaign strategies to win elections. If the NPV method replaced the Electoral College, campaigns might respond by changing their focus from swing, independent and first time voters in the swing states, to efforts designed to energize their respective party bases, in order to drive up turnout among their most ardent supporters, thereby ignoring millions of independent and swing voters.
Currently, campaigns focus on undecided voters in swing states. So, in reality, even though the campaigns spend copious amounts of time and money in the swing states, they are primarily trying to reach a small fraction of the voters in those states, not the vast majority that have already decided to vote for one candidate or the other. current swing voter tactics will be replaced by campaigns that will focus on motivating party loyalists to get to the polls. This will have several deleterious effects including ignoring lukewarm voters who need some encouragement to vote and causing the parties to pander more intensively to their respective bases, leading to an even more polarized electorate. If the Electoral College is replaced by an NPV, campaigns will find it more economically sound to use ads to drive turnout of likely Republican or likely Democratic voters, instead of reaching out to independents, moderates, and first-time voters.
C. Damaging the Integrity of the Constitution's Federal Design
A constitutional amendment making the NPV the law of the land would change more than the manner in which we elect presidents; it would weaken the constitutional framework the Framers envisioned for the country. The Framers debated how best to put together a country comprised of both large and small population states. Large states wanted greater representation based on population, while small states feared they would not have a voice in the new government. 104 What came about was the Great Compromise, with the House of Representatives apportioned based on population, giving large states proportional, and thus greater representation, and with small states awarded equal representation in the Senate. 105 The Electoral College was another compromise between factions that wanted a direct popular vote election of the president and those that wanted the president elected by Congress. 106 The Electoral College grants smaller states a greater say in who is elected president. To eliminate the two electoral votes allocated to each state to equalize their importance would stand to create a bifurcated country based on large states and small states, which would not ameliorate the underlying problem that our current system has created of greatly diminishing the electoral significance of hundreds of millions of Americans.
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The clearest example of how the NPV would hurt the interests of small states and their voters is a comparison between the most populous state, California, and the least populous state, Wyoming. 107 According to the 2010 U.S. Census, California has 37,253,956 residents, in excess of twelve million more than Texas, the second most populous state. 108 On the other hand, Wyoming has a population of only 563,626 residents. 109 California has sixtysix times the population of Wyoming. Therefore, under an NPV system, California would have roughly sixty-six times more power to elect the president than Wyoming.
Delegates representing small states at the Constitutional Convention feared an NPV, because their states would be overwhelmed by the voting strength of the larger states. 110 The Electoral College significantly augments the relative voting power of smaller states vis-à-vis larger states. After the 2010 reapportionment, California had a total of fifty-five electoral votes and Wyoming had the minimum of three. 111 
A. Advantages of the FDPV
The solution to our current electoral inequality is to modify the Electoral College, not to eliminate it. The Electoral College was a pragmatic solution to allay the fear that larger states would overshadow smaller states. However, problems have arisen that the Framers could not have foreseen. That is why the country as a whole needs to have a serious debate about revamping the Electoral College and adopting the Federal District Popular Vote (FDPV) allocation model.
Maine and Nebraska currently employ the FDPV: electoral votes are awarded to the popular vote winner in each of the state's congressional districts, with two at-large electoral votes awarded to the winner of the state's overall popular vote. 116 A recent poll in Nebraska shows that the majority of the state's voters support the congressional district allocation plan. 117 The FDPV allocation plan has several advantages. First, it would preserve the Electoral College's attempt to protect small states from being neglected in favor of large states, while correcting the disparity between swing and non-swing states. Second, it would do away with the swing state focused campaigns and encourage candidates to campaign and spend money in many more states, thereby reaching many more voters. Third, it may lead to more voter interest in safe congressional districts, thereby leading to higher voter turnout throughout the country. 
FDPV: Preserving the Constitution's Federal Framework
Changing the current winner-take-all Electoral College allocation method to the FDPV allocation method does not change the intent of the Framers. The FDPV preserves the Framers' intent in three principal ways: (1) it is within the states' legislative power to allocate electoral votes, staying faithful to Article II of the U.S. Constitution, (2) each state would still receive the representation that protects the interests of smaller population states, and (3) in the early days of our republic the FDPV was used by many states.
First, the FDPV allocation method would stay true to the compromise that formed the Electoral College and the Framers' intent for Federalism. The Electoral College would be preserved, with the only change being the manner in which each state's slate of electors is chosen. Under the Constitution, state legislatures have plenary power when it comes to allocating their states' Electoral College votes. 118 The FDPV would preserve each state's right to allocate electors in the manner they choose, since it would be up to the state to enact legislation to either unilaterally change from a winner-take-all allocation method to the FDPV, or to enact legislation to join the proposed FDPV Compact.
Second, each state would still receive the same number of electoral votes: two at-large electoral votes awarded to each state, and an additional number of electoral votes based on the number of congressional districts allocated to the state. This additional number of electoral votes is based on the population of the state, and it ranges from fifty-three (California) to one (Montana, Wyoming, Alaska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont and Delaware). 119 Finally, from the Presidential Election in 1789 until 1832, the states that made up the United States employed various methods of allocating their electoral votes. 120 126 The data from Swing State Project shows that there are seventy-three congressional districts in twenty-four states that have voted for both parties in the past three presidential elections. 127 These seventy-three congressional districts are spread out all over the country, from California in the West, to Illinois in the Midwest, to New York in the East, and to Georgia in the South. 128 However, if we apply a broader look at what constitutes a competitive district, the number of competitive districts increases to 141 spread among thirty-four states. This broader category includes the seventy-three districts that swung at least once in those three presidential elections and those that were decided by five or less points in at least one of those three presidential elections. 129 This category greatly expands the map to include a district in very red Alabama to a district in very blue Georgia is an excellent counter-example. Though a solidly red state rated "Strong Republican" by The New York Times, 135 under the FDPV method Georgia's two competitive districts would encourage candidates to invest campaign resources in the state, thereby giving the state's voters a greater opportunity to understand the issues and candidates.
It is important to point out that the FDPV will not extinguish the importance of the swing states in electing the president, but they will no longer be the only states that will decide the results of presidential elections. Neither an attack on swing states nor an attempt to render them politically meaningless, the FDPV is intended to actively involve more Americans in the election of their president.
Under the FDPV, the swing states will still enjoy a prominent position in the election of the president, even though it will be diminished compared to the virtual monopoly of the candidates' time and money the swing states currently enjoy. Under the FDPV, the swing states would still host about one-third of the country's competitive districts. In fact, forty-four of the country's 141 competitive congressional districts are in the nine 2012 swing states. 136 Florida leads with twelve competitive districts, followed by Ohio with seven, Virginia with six, North Carolina and Wisconsin with five, Colorado with three, and Nevada, Iowa and New Hampshire with two each. 137 Assuming that each district is equal and will receive an equal amount of time and money, the current swing states would still receive roughly a third of the campaigns' resources, but the other fortyone states would receive the other two-thirds. This would lead to more favorable results in voter interest and turnout in the rest of the country.
FDPV: Increasing Turnout, Participation and Representation in States Without Competitive Districts
The FDPV would also benefit the seventeen states that do not contain a competitive congressional district by encouraging voters in congressional districts dominated by the minority party in a state to vote so that they may ensure their favored candidate gets one electoral vote closer to 270.
Mississippi offers a prime example of this incentive. A solidly Republican state rated "Strong Republican" by The New York Times, 138 Mississippi has four congressional districts, 139 three solidly Republican and one, the second congressional district, solidly Democratic. 140 This Comment contends that the FDPV would benefit the voters of Mississippi in two principal ways: first, 136 DavidNYC, supra note 123. 137 it would encourage the voters of the second congressional district to vote. Instead of being wasted in a failed effort to win the state, their votes would deliver their congressional district's electoral vote to the Democratic candidate; and second, awarding an electoral vote to the Democratic candidate better represents the will of the voters in the state. In the last four presidential elections the Democratic candidate has received 41%, 40%, 43%, and 44% of the popular vote in Mississippi; however, because of the winner-take-all method, the Democratic candidate received 0% of the state's electoral votes. 141 The same is true for solidly Democratic Maryland. Though rated "Strong Democratic," by The New York Times, 142 two of Maryland's eight congressional districts are dependably Republican. Even though the Democratic candidate will win the state's popular vote, Republican voters in western Maryland's sixth congressional district and in the Delmarva Peninsula's first congressional district will be more motivated to vote because their votes will not be meaningless, but instead would add two electoral votes to the Republican candidate's total. 143 
Concerns Regarding the FDPV's Effects on the State of Politics
There are two main concerns regarding the FDPV proposal. First, some argue that the FDPV would increase the likelihood of a president winning the majority of the electoral votes while losing the popular vote. This would have occurred in the 2012 presidential election if the actual voting patterns were counted under the FDPV model. 144 Second, some observers view it as simply a partisan power grab. 145 First, some argue that the FDPV would lead to an increased likelihood of "an Electoral College misfire" which occurs when the candidate receiving the minority of the popular vote wins the majority in the Electoral College. 146 Some will point out that the presidential election of 2012 would have been just such a misfire. In the 2012, President Obama received 65,899,625 votes, 51.02% of the popular vote and 332 electoral votes, compared to 60,928,981 votes, 47.18% of the popular vote and 206 electoral votes received by Governor Romney. 147 However, some will argue that had the FDPV been in effect for the 2012 presidential election, then Governor Romney would have won the election with 273 electoral votes to President Obama's 262. 148 Therefore, the candidate receiving roughly five million fewer popular votes would have been elected President.
However, this is a static analysis, since it is simply unknowable whether that result would have occurred. To come to the conclusion that Mitt Romney would have won the 2012 presidential election one would have to assume that the candidates would not have changed campaign tactics at all, running swing-state campaigns under a swing-district model. In order to demonstrate how unlikely this result is, consider two states: California and New Hampshire. Under the current winnertake-all allocation method, one was a hotly contested tossup state 149 and the other was a non-competitive uncontested state. 150 There are three congressional districts that have not finalized 2012 election results and are therefore not incorporated in the total. Id.
145 Greg Sargent, DNC Slams GOP's Electoral Vote Rigging Scheme, WASH. POST (Jan.
25, 2013, 1:42 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plumline/wp/2013/01/25/dnc-slams-gops-electoral-vote-rigging-scheme/.
As you may have heard, Republicans are pushing for changes in the electoral vote system in states like Virginia, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Wisconsin-to maximize their advantage in future presidential elections in the face of demographic shifts that may be inexorably undermining their chances at winning national elections. Second, this Comment does not advocate change for partisan political reasons, but only in an attempt to make the presidential election truly national again. The FDPV will engage more Americans in the important task of electing the president and reverse an ominous trend in state level voter participation. Voter turnout data collected after the 2012 election illustrates a troubling trend. Turnout was highest in battleground states, such as Wisconsin, Iowa, and New Hampshire, while lowest in noncompetitive states like Hawaii, West Virginia, Texas, New York, and Oklahoma. 154 In addition, by advocating the nationwide implementation of the FDPV, instead of merely in selected blue states, as is currently discussed in Republican circles, the change on a national level would not necessarily favor either political party. Since red states and blue states would be implementing this allocation method, gains for a particular political party in some states would be offset by losses in other states, thus reducing partisan considerations.
Id
That the conventional wisdom that the FDPV would automatically and always favor the Republican Party 155 is an overly simplistic understanding of politics in general and the FDPV in particular. Voting patterns change over time-often quite rapidly-and therefore the partisan consequences of any particular system of awarding votes are unstable and impossible to predict with confidence. This point can be demonstrated by looking at how the current winner-take-all allocation method was viewed in the recent past. George W. Bush's victory in the Electoral College, but loss of the popular vote. 160 Clearly the perceived advantage that some argue the Republican Party would enjoy under the FDPV could easily develop into an advantage for the Democratic Party. The recent election demonstrated that the Republican vote is more spread out in congressional districts that are less lopsidedly Republican than many lopsidedly Democratic districts. 161 Pennsylvania is an excellent illustration of this point. President Obama won five of Pennsylvania's eighteen congressional districts; however, he averaged an impressive 72.46% in the districts he carried. On the other side, Governor Romney averaged just 55.07% in the districts he carried. 162 However, the surface appearance of a clear advantage to the Republican candidate based on the larger number of Republican majority districts, relies on a false assumption: that campaign strategies and tactics would remain static. Of course, no one actually believes that. If the model changes, the campaigns will change.
Further, a more detailed investigation of the congressional district data shows how this perceived advantage for the Republican candidate is just that-perceived. Of the thirteen Pennsylvania districts carried by Governor Romney, four were 160 Id. 161 Salvanto & Gersh, supra note 154.
Democratic congressional districts tend to be overwhelmingly Democratic, while Republican-held seats are not as lopsided for Republicans. This spreads Republican voting power over more districts, even if they're outnumbered statewide. Statewide, Democrats run up big margins in a few CDs, much as they do in a handful of counties, that carry them to a statewide win. This tends to be true nationwide. carried with less than fifty-one percent of the popular vote. 163 Had the FDPV been in effect, President Obama's campaign would have invested fewer resources into running up huge margins in the districts he won, and invested more time and resources into these four ultra-competitive districts, possibly swinging all four into his column.
From this example, it is easy to see how the FDPV is not a system that automatically favors Republicans. From the Pennsylvania example, we see that Republican support in many of the congressional districts is softer than Democratic support in the districts Democrats win. This means that once the campaigns adjust to the new allocation system, it will be more difficult for Republican candidates to swing Democratic districts into their column than it will be for the Democratic candidates to swing Republican districts into their column.
As the California and New Hampshire example clearly demonstrates, campaign strategies and tactics would change under the FDPV. Presidential campaigns would have to react to the changes the FDPV would usher in. Therefore, it is impossible to say with any certainty whether the FDPV would favor a particular political party, whether the 2012 election would have resulted in a misfire, or what the partisan implications would be in the distant future. What is certain is that the FDPV would lead to a more national campaign involving more Americans in the incredibly important process of electing their president.
B. Implementation
There are essentially three ways to implement the FDPV allocation method: (1) a state-by-state method, (2) a constitutional amendment, or (3) a multi-state compact that would allow states to move to the FDPV allocation plan as a group, in the same manner as the proposed National Popular Vote Interstate Compact. All three are constitutional, since according to Article II, Section 1, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, a state may allocate its electoral votes in any manner the state legislature may decide. 164 
SUPRA
1. State-by-State Adoption: Stopped at a Partisan Roadblock
The easiest method is to simply advocate that states at their own initiative decide to move to the FDPV allocation approach. Two states have already done so. This method has been used to allocate the Electoral College votes in Maine since the 1972 presidential election and in Nebraska since the 1996 presidential election. 165 The method has been well received in Nebraska and is supported by a majority of voters. 166 However, the state-by-state change has been difficult to achieve in other states, most notably in Pennsylvania. In 2011, Pennsylvania was gripped by a debate whether to adopt the congressional district allocation method instead of the current winner-take-all allocation method; ultimately, the proposed change was defeated. 171 Pennsylvania Democrats accused the Republican Governor and the Republican leaders in the legislature of playing partisan politics. 172 Another reason cited to defeat the change to the congressional district method was that Pennsylvania would lose its position as a perennial swing state, therefore greatly reducing campaign time and ad money spent in the state. 173 Pennsylvania's 2011 experience is instructive. It illustrates the difficulty that a state-by-state approach to replacing the current winner-take-all method with the FDPV method would encounter. Swing states and swing states from the recent past, like Pennsylvania, 174 would be the most difficult to move to the FDPV because they would not want to give up their enormous electoral significance. Even non-competitive states, like Mississippi or Georgia, also would be hesitant to move to the FDPV since the majority party in each state would be reluctant to relinquish electoral votes to the minority party.
Amending the Constitution: A Bridge Too Far
The second way to change the current winner-take-all Electoral College allocation method is to amend the Constitution to mandate that all states adopt the FDPV allocation method. Article V of the U.S. Constitution prescribes the means that may be utilized to amend the Constitution in order to make the FDPV the law of the land.
In order to amend the Constitution, the FDPV would need "two thirds of both Houses" or " the several States" to "call a Convention for proposing" the amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 175 Then the amendment would need to be "ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof." 176 This method has the advantage of assuaging partisan fears that their state would be giving away electoral votes to the other party, because all states would be doing so. However, this method of implementing this change is the least likely. It would not be in the swing states' best interests to change to this model. In addition, the states with at-large congressional districts would not be in a rush to support the change since they would not be affected one way or the other.
FDPV Compact: Throughway to Change
The most effective and likely way to secure real, positive change in this area is to form a compact between states much like the current NPV Compact (NPVC) that is in the process of adding states until the member states collectively possess 270 electoral votes. The NPVC is an agreement between states that would ensure that the popular vote winner would receive the majority of the electoral votes. 177 Specifically, the proposed compact would require that each member state award its electoral votes to the presidential candidate who received the largest number of popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. Because the compact would become effective only when it encompasses states collectively possessing a majority of the electoral votes, the presidential candidate receiving the most popular votes in all 50 states and the District of Columbia would be 175 guaranteed enough electoral votes in the Electoral College to be elected to the Presidency. 178 Any state may become a member of the NPVC by enacting the agreement through their state legislature. 179 So far, the agreement has been enacted in eight states and the District of Columbia, totaling 132 electoral votes. 180 I propose that the FDPV method be enacted in the same manner as the NPVC. This manner of enactment will assuage partisan fears of the majority party of the respective state that they would be giving away electoral votes to the other party's candidate. One of the main reasons that virtually the entire country adopted the current winner-take-all system was that the majority party feared that they would help the other candidate win, by giving away electoral votes to the other party. 181 For example, a Republican state like Georgia, with a Republican legislature would not unilaterally adopt the FDPV method, since of Georgia's fourteen congressional districts, three are solidly Democratic and two more could vote for a Democratic presidential nominee. 182 However, if a Democratic state like Illinois agreed to join the FDPV Compact (FDPVC), then the disadvantages to the dominant political party in each state would be lessened and would make it more likely for this method to take hold.
However, there are potential constitutional obstacles to the implementation of the NPV by means of the NPVC. 183 The most likely constitutional roadblock to implementation of the NPVC 178 Id. 179 185 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Compact Clause requires congressional approval of an interstate compact that "would enhance the political power of the member States in a way that encroaches upon the supremacy of the United States," or "impairs the sovereign rights of nonmember States." 186 Certainly, the NPVC would interfere with the function of the Electoral College as established by the Constitution by potentially requiring every compact member state to cast its electoral votes, not in accordance with the will of its own citizens, but instead in accordance with the will of the voters of all states, taken collectively.
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 187 the Court held that state imposed congressional term limits were unconstitutional because such limits would permit states to circumvent the constitutional provisions that empower Congress to establish the qualifications of its members. 188 Again, the Supreme Court held that the states are not empowered to interfere with the constitutional functions of the federal government. 189 Additional objections, both constitutional and practical, have been raised in opposition to the NPVC.
While the NPVC is simply an effort to effectively abolish the Electoral College without amending the Constitution, an FDPVC would represent an effort to extend the electoral vote allocation method currently used in Maine and Nebraska to the other fortyeight states.
I advocate that the FDPVC should be an agreement similar to the NPVC in that it would take effect when a certain number of states pass the proper legislation through their state legislatures. I believe that in order for the FDPVC to become law, it needs to assuage fears by partisans in both parties that if certain states enact this legislation it may swing an election one way or another. For this reason, I propose a two-step initiative.
The first step would be focused on getting the legislation passed in the most populous states, since that is where the majority of the swing districts are located. I propose that eight of the ten most populous states must pass the FDPVC so that opponents to the FDPVC could not argue that either party would be placed at a disadvantage. The second step would focus on passing the FDPVC in the remaining forty states. In addition, to being enacted in eight of the ten most populous states, the FDPVC would need roughly two thirds of the remaining forty states to sign on, for a total of roughly thirty-five states. In this manner states would have a legitimate way to switch to a method that would better serve their citizens, but would not be precluded by partisan fears.
Of course states in smaller groups of two or three may and would be encouraged to make compacts between themselves and pass legislation to adopt the FDPV at any time prior to the necessary number of states to enact the larger compact.
CONCLUSION
Every four years the United States of America is divided into two countries: one gets to see the presidential candidates, whose votes are actively sought, and whose electoral votes are seen as determinative in electing the president; the other country is completely forgotten, simply flyover country that the candidates bypass as they travel to events in the other country. This is the state of American presidential campaigns. The culprit is the Electoral College's winner-take-all allocation method.
Many who seek to change the Electoral College believe that an NPV is the way to repair the problems caused by the Electoral College. However, the NPV would cause new, possibly greater problems than the current system. It would lead to major metropolitan area centered campaigns, which would significantly
